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Introduction:
Foxes, Henhouses, and Commissions:
Assessing the Nonpartisan Model
in Election Administration, Redistricting,
and Campaign Finance
Richard L. Hasen*
On September 14, 2012, the University of California, Irvine School of Law,
the UC Irvine Law Review, and the University of California, Irvine Center for the
Study of Democracy sponsored a symposium, “Foxes, Henhouses, and
Commissions: Assessing the Nonpartisan Model in Election Administration,
Redistricting, and Campaign Finance,” featuring many of the nation’s leading
election law scholars. This issue of the UC Irvine Law Review contains scholarship
presented at that symposium.
The 2000 Florida debacle marked the first time in which the public focused
its attention intensely—albeit briefly—on the partisan administration of U.S.
elections. During the thirty-six days of dispute over who would get Florida’s
electoral votes and therefore the presidency, it became clear that those running
key aspects of the election had partisan ties and potentially partisan conflicts of
interest.1
Democrats criticized the actions of Florida Secretary of State Katherine
Harris, the chief election officer of the state, who was not only an elected
Republican official, but also the honorary cochair of George W. Bush’s
presidential election committee in Florida. Harris made a number of decisions—
on issues related to timing of the election contest, recount standards, and other
issues—all of which tended to benefit Republicans. Her decisions cannot be

* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
The author thanks Dean Erwin Chemerinsky for his very generous support for the symposium.
Thanks as well to the UC Irvine Law Review for agreeing to publish the symposium articles and
commentaries, and to Brittany Rodriguez, Patty Furukawa, Iris Yokoi, Rex Bossert, and the entire
UCI Law staff for excellent and professional support for the live symposium. This introduction draws
from the author’s oral remarks at the beginning of the symposium.
1. For a detailed narrative of the events surrounding the 2000 Florida controversy, see
RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT E LECTION
M ELTDOWN 11–40 (2012). The next paragraphs draw from that account.
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understood as a neutral election official simply applying a strict interpretation of
Florida’s murky election rules. For example, she adopted a very lax standard for
acceptance of late-arriving military and overseas ballots, a decision that once again
benefitted Republicans.
But while Harris was rightly the focus of Democrats’ ire, she was hardly the
only partisan involved in the process. Consider Florida Attorney General Bob
Butterworth, who issued a legal opinion on the timing of Gore’s election protest
at odds with Harris’s application. Never mind that Butterworth was one of the
honorary chairs of Gore’s campaign in Florida, and that he had no jurisdiction
under Florida law over these election matters.
Then there were local election officials and local canvassing boards. Harris’s
office had ordered a private company to produce a list of potential felons to be
removed from voter rolls. Local Republican administrators were much more likely
than Democrats to use the list to remove felons. Democrats focused on the fact
that the purge list had many false positives and led to the removal of eligible
voters who were mistaken for ineligible felons. Republicans noted that many
ineligible felons ended up voting in Florida’s election—election officials, especially
Democrats, did not remove them. When it came to recounting ballots,
Democratic county canvassing boards adopted forgiving and shifting standards for
recounting punch card ballots—decisions that helped Gore significantly narrow
his vote gap with Bush.
All of this brought Florida disputes to the courts, where six Democrats and
one independent justice on Florida’s Supreme Court issued rulings that helped
Gore continue his struggle to catch up to Bush, and then to the U.S. Supreme
Court, dividing five to four along conservative/liberal lines with the Court
ultimately ending the election contest with Bush ahead and Democrats fuming.2
In the nearly twelve years since the Florida debacle, states have done little to
remove partisan election officials from running our elections. A now familiar
divide between Republican administrators favoring integrity and Democratic
administrators favoring access quickly emerged.
Florida did make a change, but arguably to a model that makes the position
more, rather than less, partisan: the secretary of state now is an appointee of the
governor rather than an elected official.3 During the 2012 election season,
Republican Kurt Browning left his position as Florida’s appointed secretary of
state, and rumor has it he did so because he was not willing to go along with a new
controversial purge of potential noncitizen voters.4 No problem: Florida governor

2. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
3. John M. Glionna, Key States’ Ballot Officials Feel Glare of Critical Eyes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2004, at A1.
4. Marc Caputo, Florida’s Noncitizen Voter Purge Grew from Five-Minute Conversation, MIAMI
HERALD (Jun. 13, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/13/2847062/floridas-noncitizen
-voter-purge.html.
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Rick Scott appointed a new Republican secretary of state who did not have such
worries.
In Ohio, one of the most contested of battleground states, the last two
secretaries of state, Republican Ken Blackwell and Democrat Jennifer Brunner,
have made controversial decisions that seem to benefit their respective political
parties.5 Current Secretary of State Jon Husted at first appeared to try to move
above the partisan fray,6 but Democrats later accused him of favoring his party’s
positions in elections.7 We went into yet another election season concerned that
the referees are not neutral.
While there has been virtually no movement toward nonpartisan or
bipartisan models when it comes to election administration, things are different on
the redistricting front. Most prominently, California recently completed its first
round in process of redistricting done by a citizen commission whose members
were chosen through a Rube Goldberg-esque process set forth in a California
initiative.8 Ironically, Republicans touted the model as a way to take redistricting
decisions away from the Democratic-led partisan legislature. Republicans joined
with good government groups, including Common Cause, to bypass the
Democratic legislature and get the measure approved as a voter initiative. But after
the first round of redistricting, Republicans blasted the results in California as
being manipulated by Democrats on the Commission.9 Republicans ultimately
abandoned court challenges and a referendum, and California recently conducted
its first elections using the new maps.
Partisan fights over citizen redistricting were even worse in Arizona, where
the Republican governor sought to remove the head of the independent
redistricting commission as being biased toward Democrats, only to have the state
Supreme Court block the removal.10
Meanwhile, in the campaign finance arena, the Federal Election
Commission’s (FEC’s) bipartisan model of governance—no more than three

5. See HASEN, supra note 1, at 105–30.
6. Id. at 122–23.
7. Edward B. Foley, Virtue over Party: Samuel Randall’s Electoral Heroism and Its Continuing
Importance, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 475, 476 n.6 (2013); Voting Upgrades Needed: This Year's Election Was
Marred by Challenges, Confusion and Occasional Long Lines of People Waiting to Exercise their American Duty.
Let's Fix the Problems, Now, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 17, 2012, at G1.
8. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8251–53 (West 2013).
9. John Myers, The Frenzy Over ProPublica’s Redistricting Reports, KQED (Dec. 21, 2011, 10:30
PM), http://blogs.kqed.org/capitalnotes/2011/12/21/the-frenzy-over-propublicas-redistricting-report;
Olga Pierce & Jeff Larson, How Democrats Fooled California’s Redistricting Commission, PROPUBLICA (Dec.
21, 2011, 3:38 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-democrats-fooled-californias-redistricting
-commission.
10. For the history of these commissions, see Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better
Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808 (2012); Peter Miller & Bernard Grofman, Redistricting Commissions
in the Western United States, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 637 (2013); see also Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n v. Brewer, 275 P.3d 1267. 1268–70 (Ariz. 2012).
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members from one party may serve on the Commission,11 with the practical effect
being three Democrats and three Republicans serving on the Commission—
seemed to work reasonably well for many years but in more recent years has led to
party stalemates on important issues. The three-to-three deadlocks have rendered
the FEC much less powerful than it was before the rise of deadlocks, leading
reformers to call for a change from the bipartisan model. This movement appears
to have support from neither Republicans nor Democrats in Congress, and
President Obama has not followed through on his calls to reform the FEC.12
As the live symposium began in September, I raised a cluster of unanswered
questions about bipartisan and nonpartisan models:
1. Is nonpartisanship in administering elections possible? What do we mean
by nonpartisanship? Are there different models of nonpartisanship to choose
from?
2. Is nonpartisanship desirable? How does it compare to bipartisan and
partisan models on questions of accountability, accuracy, and public acceptance?
3. What can we learn from the experiences of individual states and of other
countries, and how much does our historical experience of hyperfederalized
administration block change? Are there cultural issues that differentiate us from
other mature democracies using nonpartisan models?
4. Are there differences in opinion as to whether nonpartisanship is a
desirable and/or achievable model when comparing election administration,
redistricting, and campaign finance?
5. What explains whether commissions are successes or failures? How did
the FEC move from bipartisan cooperation to confrontation?
6. What role do courts play in these disputes? Do courts count as
nonpartisan institutions? Should there be specially constituted courts to adjudicate
election-related disputes?
The articles in this symposium take us in the right direction to begin
addressing these crucial yet difficult issues. The articles cover three areas: election
administration, redistricting, and campaign finance.
In his symposium keynote address,13 Professor Ned Foley considered
whether a move to nonpartisan election administration is enough to solve the
problem of partisanship in elections, given the continued control over portions of
the electoral process by partisan legislative and executive branches.14 In his article,
Foley argues that, in some circumstances, fairness in dealing with election
controversies requires that partisan decision makers act with virtue, putting the

11.
12.

2 U.S.C. § 437c (2012).
Kim Geiger, Obama Is Urged to Take Action on Moribund FEC, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2011, at

13.
14.

Foley, supra note 7.
Id. at 477–81.
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interests of the nation (and fairness in election administration) over self-interest
and party interests.15 He explains the virtue concept through an examination of
the role Speaker of the House Samuel Randall played during the disputed HayesTilden presidential election of 1876. Foley characterizes Randall as a hero.
Other symposium articles delve into different aspects of measuring fairness
and partisanship in election administration. Chris Elmendorf and Doug Spencer
examine whether the California attorney general, who is responsible for drafting
the ballot title and summary for statewide ballot measures, drafts ballot language
in an impartial or biased way.16 Using experiments with students, the authors find
little evidence to support the idea that attorneys general manipulate the complexity
of ballot measure language for strategic benefit. The authors leave open the
possibility that attorneys general are biased in other ways, particularly on a very
small number of extremely controversial measures.
David Kimball, Martha Kropf, Donald Moynihan, Carol Silva, and Brady
Baybeck examine the views of local election administrators toward election
administration issues.17 Using survey data, the authors find that partisan
differences in election administration (such as attitudes about the desirability of
strict voter identification laws for voting) occur mainly in large electoral
jurisdictions but not in smaller jurisdictions. However, the authors find that local
election administrators’ evaluations of state and local election administration are
influenced more by outside forces than by the party affiliation of election officials.
They are pessimistic that these outside forces in the voting wars will subside any
time soon.
Bringing this first section on nonpartisan election administration to a close,
Dan Tokaji examines the workings of the Wisconsin Government Accountability
Board (GAB), the only statewide nonpartisan election administration body in the
United States.18 After explaining the origins of the GAB, Tokaji concludes that the
body has been successful in administering elections fairly in its first five years, and
that it serves as a worthy model for other states considering an alternative to
partisan administration of elections. The GAB’s performance is especially
noteworthy, Tokaji argues, given the intense partisan atmosphere of Wisconsin
politics in the last few years.
Symposium participants also considered the role of redistricting
commissions. Karin Mac Donald and Bruce Cain look in depth at California’s new
independent redistricting commission, and particularly consider how the new

15. Id.
16. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Are Ballot Titles Biased? Partisanship in
California’s Supervision of Direct Democracy, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 511 (2013).
17. David C. Kimball et al., The Policy Views of Partisan Election Officials, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
551 (2013).
18. Daniel P. Tokaji, America’s Top Model: The Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 575 (2013).
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commission worked with public testimony and other data to craft new legislative
districts.19 The authors consider the importance of qualitative data on
communities of interest, rejecting a wholly objective approach to this issue. They
conclude with an examination of the tradeoffs that redistricting officials must
make between the goal of preserving communities of interest and achieving other
goals, such as the creation of competitive districts.
Although Mac Donald and Cain focus exclusively on California, Peter Miller
and Bernie Grofman look more broadly at redistricting commissions in the
western United States.20 The authors find that redistricting commissions are more
common in the West, in part thanks to the availability of direct democracy to
implement the organizational form. Perhaps surprisingly, Miller and Grofman find
only very limited evidence that commissions are better able than legislatures to
produce compact, competitive districts that respect the boundaries of counties
and places in the states. They also find considerable variation across states and
across types of commissions.
Nicholas Stephanopoulos also looks at redistricting criteria and institutional
design through an even broader comparative lens that includes parts of Australia
along with certain U.S. states.21 Stephanopoulos concludes that jurisdictions that
have adopted consequentialist criteria for districting—in particular aiming for
district plans that promote partisan fairness or maximize competitiveness of
elections—do not do a good job in achieving those goals. However, independent
commissions have done a better job in assuring partisan fairness and
competitiveness of district elections. He concludes that “[i]ronically . . .
consequentialist criteria cannot achieve their own desired consequences—but that
non-consequentialist approaches can.”22
Symposium participants also considered the role of partisanship in
institutions charged with administering or policing compliance with campaign
finance laws. Kayla Crider and Jeffrey Milyo examine whether state ethics
commissions reduce political corruption.23 Using statistical analysis, the authors
find no strong or consistent support for the claim that state ethics commissions
reduce political corruption. Nor do the authors find any evidence that the form of
the commission—partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan—makes any difference in
the efficacy of the commissions. On the whole, Crider and Milyo are skeptical
about the entire ethics commission enterprise.

19. Karin Mac Donald & Bruce E. Cain, Community of Interest Methodology and Public Testimony, 3
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 609 (2013).
20. Miller & Grofman, supra note 10.
21. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria, 3 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 669 (2013).
22. Id. at 708.
23. Kayla Crider & Jeffrey Milyo, Do State Ethics Commissions Reduce Political Corruption? An
Exploratory Investigation, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 717 (2013).
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In the final symposium article, Michael Franz examines the role of the
Federal Election Commission, a six-member commission that has been comprised
with equal numbers of Democratic and Republican commissioners since its
inception.24 Franz examines the set of advisory opinion requests submitted to the
FEC from 1977 to 2012. He finds that, for a number of decades, the FEC
Commissioners commonly came to consensus when they interpreted the law. In
recent years, however, deadlock has become more common, and as a
consequence, the FEC has more frequently been unable to offer clear advice to
those requesting advisory opinions.
Together, these nine articles advance our understanding of the promises,
pitfalls, and remaining questions about the use of nonpartisan and bipartisan
institutions to regulate different aspects of the political process. The articles show
that nonpartisanship is no panacea to many of the problems plaguing our political
system. Still, there is hope that new and reimagined institutions can improve the
electoral process, governance, and ultimately the integrity of the political system
and the responsiveness of elected officials to the voters and the people. The work
in this area has just begun.

24. Michael M. Franz, The Federal Election Commission as Regulator: The Changing Evaluations of
Advisory Opinions, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 735, 739 n.19 (2013).

